[CROSSTALK] Lemme just look at this. So this is on the second section, companies and markets. rating downgrade shakes trade credit insurers. Okay? This is the kind of article that probably you never before would have thought, this is just totally fabulous, okay. Here it, and now, and you can understand why this is important now. This is why I'm showing you you've made progress in, in only ten lectures or twelve lectures we've had here. so it begins, insurance brokers have warned that a decision by Standard and Poor's to cut it's rating for one of the, one of the world's biggest trade credit insurers Atradius, that's their name, to near junk status. Threatens far reaching consequences for a market that oils the wheels of the global economy, okay. So here's, here's what you have, there's this company Atradius and what they do is they insure trade credit, so when companies, remember bills of exchange we talked about and I talked about acceptances where a bank Says if they don't pay, I'll pay, that's what this is. These are acceptances. This is, this is Atradius saying, if they don't pay, I will pay. And this greases the wheels of world trade, you understand. That it allows one company to buy goods from another company and receive payment, I mean, receive the goods but without paying for them. Saying I'll pay you in 90 days or something, and a bank, or Atradius guarantees that payment, okay? If they couldn't get Atradius to guarantee it, the sale wouldn't go through in the first place. Right? The goods wouldn't go. And if the goods didn't go, the sale wouldn't happen, the wheels of trade would come to a halt, in, in wholesale. That's what they're worried about. Atradius has a share of almost a 3rd of the global credit insurance market, writing more than a billion dollars worth of premiums a year. A billion dollars worth of premiums. That's not the amount of trade you're guaranteeing, okay, that's the premiums on that amount of trade, okay, so that if it's a tiny percentage of the, of the of the amount. Imagine this being multiplied by a hundred or a thousand or something like that, is the, is the amount of trade that would come to a halt if Atradius was not, was not able to. Now third of it, what's the problem? The problem is that the owner of Atradius is this company called Grupo Catalana Occidente, its main shareholder. Okay, so there are shares here and it's owned by this group, Grupo Catalana Occidente. So let's just say GCO okay, and that's their owner and the problem is that GCO has a lot of spanish sovereign debt on its balance sheet. Okay. So they're writing insurance. Okay. We, we, in, in this course we treat insurance as a liability, potential liability of Atraduis. Okay? So there's insurance here. [SOUND] [INAUDIBLE] And if the, if Atradius has to pay out on that insurance, okay, and it has some secure, it has some assets here, some securities of some kind, probably short term money market, something or other, the article doesn't talk about that. The point is when it has to payout on it's insurance contracts it has some assets here that it can liquidate in order to payout, okay. But ultimately it's the deep pockets behind Atradius is GCO, okay, because they're the owner. So if, if Atradius has too many claims, okay? On, and, and it goes bankrupt or something, it's a claim on GCO. So, the question is, is GCO credit worthy? They've got all this stuff here, okay? And they have an equity tranche here. And the question is, this stuff may not be worth very much, and if this is not worth very much, then these insurance contracts aren't worth very much, and so they're downgrading Atradius to triple B, just two notches above junk, and the lowest rating it's given to any of the big three trade credit insurers. in, in the world. Okay. Atradius said that it and it's main shareholder, GCO were both financially strong and well capitalized companies with regulatory solvency capital substantially in excess of the current regulatory requirements. Okay. Regulatory solvency capital. For which, no doubt, the regulators allow you to count this sovereign debt, not at its market value, okay, but at, but at its nominal value, okay. The regulatory capital. But regulatory capital is, the market looks at that and they say, regulatory, schmegulatory, what do I care, okay. This is not actually an asset, and so I'm not doing business with you, okay. So this is, this is the problem. The, if you, if you went through the financial crisis of 2007, you'll remember that one of the most important ways in which the crisis of banks got transmitted to the real economy was through a freeze up in trade credit, and this was world wide, okay, that, that banks just stopped insuring trade credit and so foreign, foreign trade just plummeted. A lot of, a lot of exports and imports on both sides just plummeted in, in, in, after 2008. That's and having that in mind, when you read this, its not any longer a little technical weirdness okay, this is a big warning, a big warning sign. for, for transmission of the euro troubles okay, into troubles with actual, actual trade world wide. One third of outstanding trade credit is, is written by this company here. [BLANK_AUDIO].